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This paper investigates whether the securitization of corporate bank loans had an impact on the price
of corporate debt. Our results suggest that loan facilities that are subsequently securitized are associated
with a 15 basis point lower spread than that of loans that are not subsequently securitized. To identify
the particular role of securitization in loan pricing, we employ a difference in differences approach
and consider loan characteristics that are associated with the likelihood of securitization. We document
that Term Loan B facilities, facilities originated by banks that originate CLOs, and loans of B-Rated
firms are securitized more frequently than other loans. Spreads on facilities estimated to be more likely
to be subsequently securitized have lower spreads than otherwise similar facilities. The results are
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1.  Introduction. 
 
While much attention has focused on the role of securitization in the mortgage market, relatively 
little has been paid to the securitization of corporate bank loans in the form of Collateralized Loan 
Obligations (CLOs).
1 This lack of attention is surprising given that both the volume of non-investment 
grade bank loans and the number of newly-originated CLOs spiked dramatically between the years 2002 
and 2007, from over $125 billion of loans and 43 CLOs in 2002 to over $540 billion of loans and 213 
CLOs in 2007.
2  One potential explanation for this pattern was that the popularity of CLOs created a 
demand for collateral that could be used to construct them (see for example Gennaioli, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2010)).  Consequently, banks active in the securitization business had incentives to adjust their 
lending behavior to increase the quantity of loans that could be used for collateral, affecting the cost of 
capital for firms in the primary lending market. 
In this paper we estimate the extent to which the practice of securitizing bank debt influenced the 
cost of such debt for borrowers in the primary corporate debt market.   To do so, we rely on a sample of 
over 7,000 loan facilities from the Dealscan database.  We match these loans to a database of CLOs 
provided by Moody’s, which contains the identity of the underlying collateral in each CLO.  We first 
address the question of whether a loan that was ultimately securitized had a lower spread than an 
otherwise similar loan that was not securitized.  Our estimates indicate that the answer to this question is a 
clear “yes”; they suggest that of the most-commonly securitized facilities (a B-rated, Term Loan B), a 
facility that is ultimately securitized has about a 15 basis point lower yield than an otherwise identical 
loan that was not securitized.   
There are a number of possible interpretations to this result.  It is possible that CLOs, for some 
unidentified reason, were more likely to add relatively low-yielding loans in their portfolio, or that an 
omitted variable is driving both spreads and securitization demand in our specification.  Alternatively, 
                                                 
1 See for example Mian and Sufi (2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008), Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008), 
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), and Nadauld and Sherlund (2010).     
2 The estimates on the dollar volume of non-investment grade loans originated in 2002 and 2007 are likely 
understated in both years. The reported figures are calculated using our sample of U.S. originated syndicated bank 
loans made to non-financial borrowers with available sales data that is described below in Section 3.     2 
there could have been a reduction in the demand for capital from the firms whose loans tend to be 
securitized. These interpretations imply that although CLOs have lower-yielding loans in their portfolio, 
there are no distortionary real effects from their existence, since their role is to reallocate the loans that 
would have been made in their absence.  More consistent with the securitization-driven explanations of 
the Financial Crisis is a story in which banks have a high demand for securitizable loans when they put 
together CLOs and consequently lower the yields to attract more borrowers.  This latter explanation 
implies that demand for loans from CLOs has a real effect, as it lowers the cost of capital for the firms 
obtaining the loans. 
To distinguish between these explanations, we utilize a “Difference in Differences” approach 
based on factors that are correlated with the demand for bank loans from participants in the securitization 
market (and thus impacts credit supply in the primary market) but uncorrelated with the demand for credit 
from corporate borrowers in the origination market.  First, we make use of features related to the structure 
of corporate loans.  Corporate loans are typically made up of a number of tranches (also referred to as 
facilities), usually containing an amortizing “Term Loan A” portion, a bullet “Term Loan B” portion, and 
a “Revolver” that can be drawn down at the discretion of the borrower.  These tranches usually have the 
same seniority, but because of the amortization of Term Loan A and the options implicit in the revolver, 
they have different effective maturities and yields.  An important difference between the tranches, 
however, is that typically only the Term Loan B (bullet) portion is securitized, while the other tranches 
are typically held by the issuing bank.
3  Consequently, the difference in yields between the tranches 
potentially reflects differences in demands for securitizable loans, among other factors. 
Second, we use the identity of the loan-arranging bank in our identification strategy. Over the six-
year period between 2002 and 2007, 79% of all CLOs were underwritten by just ten banks. Leveraged 
loans arranged by banks that also underwrite CLOs are more likely to be securitized because CLO 
underwriters can more accurately evaluate the value of a particular loan to CLO structures. That is, CLO 
underwriting banks are more likely to arrange a given bank loan for the purpose of using it as collateral in 
                                                 
3 In Section 2.2 we discuss at least two reasons why Term Loan B’s are preferred as collateral by arrangers of CLOs.    3 
a CLO.
4  We show empirically that loan facilities arranged by these securitization-active banks were 
securitized more frequently than loans issued by other banks.   
Third, the credit rating of borrowers affects the likelihood of being securitized. In a sample of B 
and Ba-rated bank loans, holding other factors constant, the lower credit quality B-rated firms obtained 
loans that were more likely to be securitized.  This pattern is consistent with Benmelech and Dlugosz 
(2009), who document that cash-flow arbitrage CLOs tend to employ B-rated bank loans as collateral.  
Demand from deal arrangers in the securitization market for B-rated collateral rather than Ba-rated 
collateral represents an increase in demand for corporate bank loans that is unrelated to factors affecting 
the demand for loans from borrowers in the primary loan market. 
We exploit these three institutional features of the CLO market to identify the impact of 
securitization on the cost of corporate credit. Since increased demand for securitizable assets should occur 
in Term Loan B facilities originated by securitization-active banks, we estimate the difference between 
spreads on these loans relative to Term Loan B facilities issued by non-securitization active banks.  We 
find that spreads on Term Loan B facilities originated by securitization-active banks are 11 basis points 
lower than spreads on facilities issued by other banks, holding other factors constant. 
If this decline occurs because of demand for securitizable loans, then we expect this decline in 
spreads to be larger in B-rated debt than in Ba-rated debt because B-rated debt is securitized more 
frequently.  For this reason, in a sample of Term Loan B facilities only, we estimate the difference in 
spreads between B-rated facilities originated by securitization-active banks and compare those estimates 
to spreads on Ba-rated facilities originated by securitization-active banks.  Consistent with a securitization 
demand-driven hypothesis, our estimates indicate that the difference in the spread on loans issued by 
securitization-active banks to B-rated borrowers was almost 23 basis points lower than the spread on 
loans made by non-securitization active banks to B-rated borrowers. In contrast, there is virtually no 
difference in spreads between Ba-rated loans from securitization-active banks and non-securitization 
active banks. 
                                                 
4 We discuss more specifically why this is the case in Section 2.   4 
In addition, if the demand to securitize Term Loan B facilities issued to B-rated borrowers was 
highest among securitization-active banks, we would expect to find differences in the spreads of Term 
Loan B facilities with these securitization-friendly attributes relative to Term Loan A facilities or 
Revolving facilities.  Our estimates indicate that the incremental effect of being a securitization-friendly 
Term Loan B facility is 32.9 basis points relative to Term Loan A’s and is 19.5 basis points relative to 
revolvers.  These equations imply that the drop in spreads for securitization-friendly facilities do not 
reflect a bank-specific characteristic, such as an increased risk tolerance, since this characteristic would 
likely be reflected in the spreads of securitization-friendly Term Loan A facilities and revolvers as well. 
Another way to do the comparison is by estimating the factors that affect the differences across 
facilities within a particular loan.  This approach has the advantage of having common underlying risks 
within the loan, although the data is limited to loans that contain multiple types of facilities.  In this case, 
the differences in spreads between Term Loan B and either Term Loan A or revolvers decline with 
characteristics associated with securitization, again consistent with the view that demand for collateral for 
CLOs affects the pricing of the loans in the primary market.   
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that CLOs’ demand for collateral affected pricing 
in the corporate debt market.  While the effect of the securitization-driven debt market on the housing 
market during the 2002-2007 period is well-known, and Shivdasani and Wang (2011) and Axelson et al. 
(2011) have documented that the debt market was an important driver of the LBO boom during that 
period, our results suggest that securitization had a pricing impact on the corporate debt market more 
broadly.  
   5 
2.  Institutional Background. 
Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) transform speculative-grade bank loans into highly-rated 
bonds through the process of pooling and tranching.
5 The incidence of securitizing corporate bank loans 
exploded between 2002 and 2007 and has been well documented in the literature and popular press.  Over 
80% of the CLOs originated between 1996 and 2008 were originated in the years 2002-2007, with nearly 
50% occurring in 2006 and the first-half of 2007 alone (see Table 4). Also noteworthy is the fact that 
between 2002 and 2007, 79% of new CLOs were originated by just ten banks.  In short, the creation of 
CLOs was very active over a relatively short period of time and concentrated in a relatively small number 
of originating banks.   
Theoretically, securitization can occur for a number of reasons.  First, DeMarzo (2005) suggests 
that securitization reduces asymmetric information problems about the quality of individual loans by 
providing the purchaser with a diversified pool of loans from different issuers, presumably having a lower 
information asymmetry problem than any individual loan would have. Second, Gaur, Seshadri and 
Subrahmanyam (2009) point out that securitization reduces market incompleteness, providing investors 
who value that particular cash flow distribution with the ability to purchase it.  Finally, Coval, Jurek, and 
Stafford (2009), relying on the assumption that investors purchase bonds based solely on credit ratings, 
attribute the proliferation of securitization activity to the potential for deal arrangers to deliver the 
cheapest possible set of assets that can obtain a high quality credit rating, thereby engaging in ratings 
arbitrage. The observation that the bank loans of B-rated borrowers get securitized more frequently than 
Ba-rated loans is consistent with a “cheapest-to-deliver” view of collateral selection in securitization.  
Yet, none of these theories of securitization provides a rationale for why securitization should 
affect the spreads on loans that subsequently are securitized.  In other words, given two loans, why should 
their spreads differ depending on whether they are subsequently securitized if the risks associated with the 
loans’ repayment are identical?  For this to be the case, the very process of securitization likely influences 
                                                 
5 The term “Tranche” is used to describe different bonds arising from a CLO deal and is also used to describe 
different loan facilities within a bank loan. The term tranche in this sentence refers to the tranches (bonds) that arise 
from the origination of a CLO.     6 
the lender’s decision about the loan at the time of origination.  One way in which this influence could 
occur would be if the lender itself is heavily involved in putting together the collateral of the CLO, either 
through a close relationship with the collateral manager of the CLO or in warehousing the loans to be 
used as collateral in the CLO. If this lender has a high demand for securities that can subsequently 
become part of the CLO, it has an incentive to offer the borrower a lower interest rate than it otherwise 
would given current market rates and the risk on that particular investment.
6  Consequently, the 
securitized loans end up having interest rates that do not fully reflect the risks associated with the cash 
flow distributions generated by their collateral.
7 
2.1. The Structure of Loans. An important feature that we rely on to identify the demand for securitizable 
loans is the structure of the bank loans themselves.
8  Bank loans usually receive capital from a syndicate 
of lenders, made up of up to three types of investors:  institutional investors, banks, and finance 
companies.  To cater to the preferences of each type of investor, these loans contain multiple facilities or 
tranches. Commercial banks typically invest in the revolving portion of the loan. “Revolving” credit lines 
can be drawn down and repaid at the discretion of borrowers, but fees are paid based on the entire amount 
committed to the lending facility regardless of whether it has been drawn down. “Term Loan A” facilities 
are typically senior, amortizing loans that are generally kept by the issuing bank or purchased by other 
commercial banks. In contrast, “Term Loan B” facilities, which are also senior and usually pari passu to 
the Term Loan A, typically mature with bullet payments, and are usually sold to institutional investors.  
                                                 
6 The underwriter of a CLO (securitization-active bank) frequently warehouses loans that are to be used as collateral 
in a CLO during the portfolio selection process. An underwriting bank is likely to feel more comfortable 
warehousing a loan that it originated rather than a loan on which it has less information.   
7 An obvious question is why this effect does not just lower interest rates for all firms, because all borrowers will 
flock to the securitizing banks, so that to attract borrowers, non-securitizing banks will lower their rates to match the 
securitizing banks.  Presumably, to some extent, non-securitizing banks did lower their interest rates (conditional on 
credit quality), but because of the relationship-specificity in banking and CLO creation, were able to keep some 
customers despite charging a higher interest rate than their securitizing competitors. 
8 We rely on the institutional details provided in a primer on Bank Loans published annually by Standard and Poor’s 
(2009).   7 
Term Loan B facilities are appealing to CLOs for a number of reasons.
9  The main difference 
between Term Loan A and Term Loan B concerns the payout structure, which is amortizing for Term 
Loan A facilities and bullet for Term Loan B.  The amortizing payout structure leads to a shorter duration 
for Term Loan A than Term Loan B facilities.  This shorter duration creates reinvestment risk, and even if 
there are good places to reinvest the money, the CLO managers are more frequently required to search for 
places to reinvest the steady stream of amortized principal as it is paid back. Collateral managers find it 
easier to reinvest the bullet payments of Term Loan B’s when they mature or prepay.
10 In addition, the 
purchasers of AAA bonds (insurance companies, pension funds) produced by CLOs tend to prefer to 
purchase bonds with longer maturity. It is easier for CLO arrangers to create bonds with a longer expected 
maturity with collateral of longer duration.   
CLOs are far more likely to invest in institutional tranches (Term Loan B specifically) than in the 
revolving facilities or Term Loan A facilities (see Table 2, Panel B). When demand for loans from CLOs 
increased dramatically in the 2002-2007 period, this demand likely affected the Term Loan B portion of 
corporate loans substantially more than either the Term Loan A portion or the revolver portion.  
To illustrate the nature and complexity of a multiple-facility bank loan, we provide a detailed 
example of a typical loan.  Table 1 documents the details of the financing involved in the 2005 leveraged 
buyout of the British tire firm Kwik-Fit.
11  The total transaction value of £773.5M included £582.5M of 
term-loan debt, £40M in a revolving credit facility, and £50M in a Capex facility. This type of multiple-
facility financing structure is not specific to LBO transactions, but also characterizes many corporate 
loans. The Term Loan A facility of £140M, featuring a 7-year amortizing term and spread of 225 basis 
points over LIBOR, is typically purchased by commercial banks. In contrast, the Term Loan B facility is 
often securitized; in the Kwik-Fit Example it is of £135M, and has an 8-year bullet payment and pays a 
                                                 
9 This paragraph is based on conversations with practitioners who originate CLOs and summarizes the typical 
arguments for why CLOs usually prefer to purchase the Term Loan B tranche of a loan rather than the Term Loan A 
tranche. 
10 Because of these differences in duration, we control econometrically for differences in term structure when 
estimating differences in spreads between Term Loan B’s, revolvers and Term Loan A’s below. 
11 The Kwik-Fit example documented in Table 1 is taken from Axelson et al. (2011).   8 
spread of 250 basis points over LIBOR. This particular transaction also contains a Term Loan C, which is 
similar in features to the Term Loan B. 
 2.2. The Ratings Structure of CLOs. The predominant form of corporate loan securitization is what is 
known as a cash-flow arbitrage CLO.
12 The idea underlying this structure is to combine a group of low-
rated loans into a structure that has a higher rating. Covenants in CLO deals require that each deal 
maintain a minimum weighted-average credit rating (WAR), which is calculated as the average credit 
rating of the collateral, weighted by the size of each piece of collateral.  Not surprisingly, CLOs are 
almost always structured to use the minimum quality collateral so as to satisfy this constraint and yield a 
high, usually AAA, rating for the CLO.  Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), analyzing a comprehensive 
sample of cash-flow arbitrage CLOs, document that the weighted-average credit rating in 85% of the 
deals in their sample was B+ (B1 in Moody’s rating classification). Furthermore, they document that the 
average B1 rating of the collateral was almost uniformly met with uniformly B-rated collateral (with 
collateral concentrated specifically in the B1 rating).
13  
Consequently, when demand for CLO collateral increased in the securitization-active period, we 
expect that this demand will be reflected in demand for B-rated collateral more than for higher-rated debt.  
This increase should be in the institutional (Term Loan B) tranche of the loan and not for the Term Loan 
A or revolver tranches of the loans.  In addition, it should be higher for loans issued by banks active in 
securitization, that presumably package these loans immediately into the CLOs that they arrange 
themselves.  These differences in attractiveness to originators of CLOs lead to clear identification of the 
effect of demand for collateral on the relative pricing of different kinds of bank loans.   
 
   
                                                 
12 Other forms of CLOs include balance sheet CLOs, whose primary purpose is to remove loans from bank’s balance 
sheets. According to Moody’s data on CLO originations, balance-sheet CLOs represent about 1% of all CLOs. 
13 The average CLO deal in their sample transformed the B-rated collateral into securities in which 70% of the 
principle balance of the originated bonds were rated AAA, while 90% of the principle was rated BBB or higher. The 
pattern is very similar in the Moody’s sample of CLOs we analyze below.   9 
3. Data 
To study the way in which securitization affects the pricing of loans, we utilize data from two 
publicly available databases: Reuter’s Dealscan and Moody’s EMS data services. We restrict our sample 
to Dealscan loan facilities originated between 2002 and September of 2007, which represents the 
beginning of disruptions in the CLO market.  Our sample requires that facilities have Moody’s credit 
ratings on the borrowing firm’s senior debt at the time of loan origination.
14 Our analysis focuses 
specifically on firms with Moody’s senior-debt credit ratings of B (B1, B2, or B3) or Ba (Ba1, Ba2, Ba3). 
We further restrict the sample to include only syndicated loans originated in the United States and remove 
financial firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6500. We also identify and remove any second-lien or 
mezzanine loans from the sample.  
  The Moody’s EMS sample provides data on the characteristics and identity of all the securities 
serving as collateral in any Moody’s-rated CLO as of the first quarter 2009. The strength of the Moody’s 
data is that it allows us to identify exactly which loan facilities serve as collateral in CLOs as of the first 
quarter 2009. Unfortunately, it provides only a one-time snapshot of securitized loans, and does not 
contain unique identifiers that map to Dealscan. 
To illustrate how our matching of the two databases occurs consider the following examples from 
the Dealscan and Moody’s EMS databases. In October 2006, Armstrong World Industries raised $1,100M 
through a bank loan; $300M in the form of a revolving line, $300M in a Term Loan A facility, and the 
remaining $500M in a Term Loan B facility.  The Moody’s EMS database reports a security with the 
name “Armstrong World Ind. – Term Loan B” in the amount of $500M with expected maturity in 
October 2013. It is important to note that no other facility associated with the Armstrong World Industries 
bank loan appears in the Moody’s database. Consequently, we classify the Term Loan B portion of the 
Armstrong debt issuance as being securitized while the Revolving and Term Loan A facilities are not.  
                                                 
14 We require the rating on the senior debt and not on the specific loan because it is available for a much larger 
number of loans:  there are 7,331 loans on Dealscan that meet our sample criteria for which there is a rating on the 
senior debt and only 3,335 for which there is a rating on the specific loan. For the loans in our sample that have both 
loan-specific credit ratings and senior-debt credit ratings, the ratings are either the same or within one ratings class 
(i.e. B1 senior debt and Ba3, B1, or B2 loan-specific rating) over 72% of the time.    10 
We emphasize, however, that there are limitations inherent in constructing the database in this 
manner.  Because the Moody’s data represent a snapshot of CLOs in 2009, we cannot tell whether a loan 
was initially securitized and subsequently paid off prior to 2009 or if it was included and then dropped 
from the CLO prior to 2009.
15  In addition, the imperfect nature of matching suggests that some matches 
were likely missed due to human error or uncertainty in the naming of the facilities.  Consequently, it is 
likely that the matching process employed here understates the number of loans in our sample that are 
securitized. For these reasons, our primary empirical strategy does not rely on an exact determination of 
whether a loan was securitized. Rather, we rely on the EMS database to identify attributes of loans that 
are simply correlated with securitization activity.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics on our sample of facility-level loan data. Panel A provides 
statistics on the number and spread over LIBOR for securitized and un-securitized loan facilities of 
different credit qualities.  As expected, loan spreads increase monotonically as credit quality declines.  
Panel B breaks down these statistics by facility type. It indicates that revolving facilities are the most 
common facility, followed by Term Loan B’s and Term Loan A’s.  Panel C reports the same statistics 
broken down by the reported purpose of the facility. The somewhat vague description of “corporate 
purposes” appears most frequently in the data, followed by debt repayments and corporate takeovers.  
Facilities supporting leveraged buyouts represent 12% of the loan facilities we study, and these loans are 
securitized at a higher rate than other loan facilities.  
Table 3 documents the differences in the attributes of loan facilities identified as having been 
securitized, compared to their non-securitized counterparts. This table indicates that securitized loans 
have lower spreads, with differences in spreads increasing as credit quality declines. In addition 
securitized loans have larger facility sizes, slightly longer maturities, and were arranged by smaller 
syndicates.  The differences between securitized and non-securitized loans highlight the importance of 
                                                 
15 Collateral managers of CLOs actively manage the portfolio through time selling one loan and replacing it with 
another.  They would do so because their compensation is in part tied to the adequacy of the collateral pool. CLOs 
do contain covenants that constrain the frequency of trading within the collateral. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) 
report that “typically 10-15% of the par value of assets may be traded per year in addition to defaulted securities or 
credit-risk securities.”   11 
controlling for differences in facility size, sales size, tranche maturity, and covenants, in drawing 
inferences on the incremental effect of securitization.  
The time-series pattern of CLO origination in our sample is illustrated in Table 4.  The sample is 
predominately made up of CLOs originated between 2002-2007.  In addition, the CLOs are highly 
concentrated among a relatively small number of originating banks, with the top 10 banks underwriting 
692 of the 884 CLOs (78%) over the entire sample and 569 of the 719 deals (79%) during the 2002-2007 
time period. Although Table 4 focuses on the CLO underwriting activity of 18 unique banks, at least 38 
different banks were involved in the underwriting of at least one CLO between the years 1996 and 2008.   
Figure 1 plots the quantity of originations of Term Loan B facilities over time. Panel A plots the 
three-month moving average of the number of Term Loan B facilities originated by securitization-active 
and non-securitization active banks, where a securitization-active bank is defined as one of the top ten 
banks ranked by the number of securitization deals underwritten during our sample period.
16 The plot 
indicates that origination patterns were very similar until 2002, when securitization active banks began to 
increase their origination of Term Loan B facilities aggressively. Panel B plots the origination activity of 
securitization-active banks by credit rating. The plot indicates that much of the boom in Term Loan B 
originations was concentrated in loans of a lower credit-quality. Finally, Panel C plots the origination 
activity of non-securitization active banks by credit quality. While non-securitization active banks also 
increased their origination of lower credit quality loans, the plots suggest that the difference was not as 
dramatic as the difference observed in the origination activity of securitization-active banks. Overall, 
these plots suggest that there was a dramatic increase in securitization activity after 2002, and that this 
increase was concentrated in the securitization-active banks, and in lower credit quality issues. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Determining the appropriate cutoff for classifying whether a bank is “securitization active” requires some 
discretion. Given that ten banks are responsible for the vast majority of CLO creation, we feel it an appropriate 
cutoff.   In separate analysis we check the robustness of our primary results to different securitization active cutoffs 
and find similar results.      12 
4. Results 
4.1. Do Securitized Loans Have Lower Spreads?  
4.1.1.  Univariate Tests.  The question we consider in this paper is whether increased demand for 
CLOs shifted the demand for bank loans serving as collateral in CLOs, thus lowering the cost of corporate 
credit. A clear prediction of this argument is that loans that were subsequently securitized should have 
had lower spreads than loans that were not securitized.  Panel A of Table 3 performs this comparison, 
presenting the average difference in spreads between loans that were securitized and those that were not 
securitized according to the Moody’s data.  As a rough control for loan attributes, we present the 
comparison by rating class for the most commonly issued rating levels:  Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2 and B3.  
  This Panel indicates that in each rating class except for Ba1, spreads are lower for the securitized 
sample than for the non-securitized sample, with the difference ranging from 2.4 basis points for the Ba2 
rating category to 32.9 basis points for the B2 category.  These differences are consistent with the notion 
that the ability to securitize a loan leads to a lower spread and consequently a lower cost of capital for the 
firm borrowing the money.  However, it is not a conclusive estimate of the incremental effect of 
securitization on spreads for at least three reasons.  First, we have an imperfect matching of loans to 
CLOs that likely understates the fraction of loans that are securitized.  Second, these differences do not 
control for other factors that are known to affect loan pricing.  Finally, it is possible that some other factor 
could affect both spreads and securitization decisions simultaneously, leading the observed relation 
between the two to occur but not to be causal. 
  The first issue, involving the imperfect matching of loans to CLOs results from both the fact that 
we have only a snapshot of CLOs as of 2009, and also from the “by hand” nature of the matching process.  
As a result, it is likely that most or all of the loans classified as securitized really were securitized, but that 
a number of loans that we classified as non-securitized actually were securitized.  Such a misclassification 
would imply that the differences documented in Table 3 would understate the true differences in spreads 
between securitized and non-securitized loans.     13 
4.1.2.  Multivariate Tests.  The second issue, that factors in addition to whether a particular loan 
is securitized are likely to affect spreads, is addressed using a multivariate regression framework. We 
create a dummy variable set equal to one if the loan was part of a CLO in the Moody’s database, and 
estimate a regression of the following form:  
                                                                                                
 
where the subscript i refers to loan facility i at time t. The list of borrower controls includes facility-
specific credit ratings along with dummy variables for secured loans, loans with covenants, and the 
existence of a pricing grid. We also control for facility amount, facility type, borrowers sales, size of the 
lending syndicate, and tranche maturity.  
We control for macroeconomic factors such as the term structure of interest rates and changes in 
the market price of risk. Our term structure control is calculated as the difference between the five-year 
and 3-month treasury-bill rate in the month of deal origination. To control for changes in the price of 
credit risk, within each month, we calculate the spread of a ten-year Ba and B-rated bond index over the 
ten-year Treasury-bill rate. Loan facilities whose borrowers have B-rated (Ba-rated) senior debt are 
assigned the value of the B-spread (Ba-spread) in the month of origination.   
Table 5 reports estimates of this equation.  Column (1) estimates the regression with all facility 
types over the 2002 to September 2007 sample period. The results indicate that when all facility types are 
pooled, the incremental effect of securitization is not statistically meaningful.  Columns (2), (3), and (4) 
consider Term Loan B facilities only.  Column (2) suggest that the impact of securitization on spreads is 
negative and significant for all Term Loan B facilities. The estimates in Column (4) document that the 
impact of securitization on yield is concentrated in the lower-rated B loans, which are associated with a 
statistically significant 15.7 basis point drop in spread. These results are consistent with the notion that 
banks lower the spreads on loans that will be securitized. 
4.2.   A Difference in Differences Approach   14 
The results in Table 5 suggest that securitized loans are associated with lower spreads, holding 
other factors constant, at least to the extent that a loan’s risk is measured by Moody’s ratings.  But what is 
the appropriate interpretation of this finding?  The pattern is certainly consistent with the story in which 
high demand for securitizable assets from CLOs provided banks with incentives to be overly aggressive 
in lending, leading to a lower cost of capital.  However, the negative association between securitization 
and spreads does not by itself rule out an alternative story in which lending went up not because of 
anything to do with the supply of capital, but instead because of increased demand for funds.  If this 
demand-based story were the explanation for the increase in loans over the 2002-2007 period, and also 
the explanation underlying the fact that CLOs that for some reason end up with loans in their portfolios 
that have lower spreads than average for a given credit rating, then changing demand for capital could 
imply that securitized loans have lower spreads than non-securitized loans.
17  
The usual way to address this type of endogeneity is through an instrumental variables approach.  
Unfortunately, to be a valid instrument for whether a loan is securitized would require a variable to be 
related to the securitization decision but unrelated to the spread charged in the loan.  Since in practice, 
virtually all publicly-available variables relating to the loan potentially are at least arguably related to its 
spread, the use of instrumental variables is not likely to be a practical solution. 
To distinguish between alternative explanations, we instead rely on the fact that the securitization 
process by its very nature leads to a preference for certain types of loans over others.  For example, it is 
commonly believed that it is easier to construct CLOs from Term Loan B’s, which have bullet payments 
that are set in advance, than Term Loan A’s, which have amortizing payments, or revolvers, whose 
payments depend on the extent to which the borrower chooses to draw them down.  In addition, Table 4 
suggests that CLOs are highly concentrated in a small number of issuing banks, so loans initiated by those 
banks are more likely to be securitized than loans by other non-issuing banks. Finally, Benmelech and 
                                                 
17 Of course, it is not clear why CLOs would choose to purchase loans with lower spreads than average.  One 
possibility would be if spreads were not priced completely by the market for some reason, leading banks to sell the 
lower spread loans and keep the higher spread ones for any particular quality level.   15 
Dlugosz (2009) suggest that B-rated loans are the most commonly-used type of loan facility in CLOs, a 
finding confirmed in the summary statistics of our sample of securitized loans.    
Our approach is to compare the relative yields on loans with securitization-friendly characteristics 
to those with securitization-unfriendly characteristics during the 2002-2007 Securitization Boom. The 
“securitization affecting supply of capital argument” predicts that the demand from CLOs for loans 
having these attributes increased relative to other types of loans, leading to lower yields.  However, there 
is no particular reason why demand for capital should be reflected differentially between these types of 
loan offerings. Therefore, we interpret the difference in yields for loans originated by securitization-active 
banks relative to non-securitization active banks and differences between B-rated loans and Ba-rated 
loans as reflecting the effect of securitization on the cost of capital. 
4.3.  Which Factors Affect the Likelihood that a Loan is Securitized?   
A key assumption in our analysis is that the factors we posit as being related to the securitization 
decision actually do affect the likelihood a particular loan is securitized.  To ensure that these assumptions 
hold in our sample, we estimate equations predicting whether a particular loan from the Dealscan sample 
is securitized according to the Moody’s classification.  We estimate the following econometric 
specification: 
                                                                                                            
 
The Facility Type variables are dummy variables indicating the type of facility.  The equation also 
includes the borrower controls used in Table 5, with the exception of tranche maturity, which is 
essentially deterministic in tranche type.
18  Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate 
the equation by probit. We constrain the sample to include years 2002-2009, since loan facilities 
                                                 
18 Revolvers have a very short maturity while Term B and Term A facilities have longer maturities. Including 
tranche maturity in the probit specification is essentially redundant to controlling for facility type when revolvers are 
included in the sample.    16 
originated prior to 2002 likely would have matured prior to 2009, making it impossible for such loans to 
serve as collateral in CLOs as of 2009.
19   
Table 6 reports estimates of this equation.  The results in Column (1) suggest that Term Loan B 
loans are significantly more likely to be securitized than Term Loan A loans (the omitted category).  
Revolvers are securitized at a significantly lower rate than either type of Term Loan.  In Column (2) we 
classify loans as being associated with securitization active underwriters or not. The results indicate that 
loan facilities initiated by the banks designated as “Securitization Active” are more likely to be 
securitized than other loans. In Column (3) we estimate whether B-rated loans are securitized at a 
different rate than Ba-rated loans through the inclusion of a B-rated dummy variable. The results of this 
estimation confirm those of Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) and are consistent with the unconditional 
results presented in Table 2.   
In Column (4) we include tranche purpose fixed-effects and year fixed-effects, and re-estimate 
the model. These controls do not materially change the inference on securitization likelihood for Term 
Loan B or securitization-active facilities. However, in this specification we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that Ba and B loans are securitized at the same rate at conventional significance levels since the t-statistic 
drops to 1.28.  The t-statistic is sensitive to the choice of clustering standard errors by borrower; when 
they are clustered instead by credit rating, the t-statistic on the B-rated dummy variable rises to 2.78, 
which is statistically significant at conventional levels.  Overall, the results in Table 6 together with the 
evidence in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) suggest that B-rated loans are more likely to be securitized 
than Ba-rated ones, and that loans from banks designated as “Securitization Active” are more likely to be 
securitized than loans from other banks. 
4.4.  The Impact of CLO Demand on Loan Pricing: Differences in Spreads by Type of Loan 
  The hypothesis that demand from CLOs affected pricing on loans predicts that when CLO 
demand is high, then loans that are most attractive to CLOs should be favored by banks issuing loans.  
Consequently, these loans should be priced more aggressively than loans that are less attractive to CLOs.  
                                                 
19 Over 90% of the loan facilities in our sample have an expected tranche maturity of less than seven years.    17 
Since loan facilities originated by securitization-active banks appear to be more likely to be securitized 
than facilities originated by non-securitization active banks and because CLO demand appears to be more 
concentrated in B-rated debt, we hypothesize that spreads will reflect differences in this demand.   
  We test whether increased demand by CLOs lowered spreads by estimating the following 
specification:
  
                                                                                                     
 
where the sample is constrained to Term Loan B’s only. The estimate on the interaction of the 
securitization-active and B-rated dummy variables represents the difference in the spread relative to non-
securitization active B-rated loans or securitization-active Ba-rated loans, holding other factors constant. 
The other variables in the equation, represented by X i,t , are the term structure and credit spread variables 
discussed above, along with the remaining set of the controls described in our discussion of Table 5. We 
include tranche purpose fixed effects, year fixed effects, and credit-rating fixed effects where appropriate.  
As in Table 5, we cluster standard errors by year and borrower.  
 Table 7 reports estimates of this equation over the 2002- September 2007 sample period.  
Column (1) reports results controlling only for the impact of securitization-active banks on spreads, 
Column (2) adds the B-rated dummy, and Column (3) includes both of those dummy variables plus the 
interaction term. The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term is -22.7, which implies Term Loan 
B facilities from securitization-active banks had 22.7 basis point lower spreads than Term Loan B 
facilities from other banks, holding other attributes of the loan constant.  When the interaction term is 
included in Table 7, the coefficient on the securitization active bank dummy, which measures the impact 
on Ba-Rated debt (since there is a dummy interacting the B-rated dummy with the securitization active 
bank dummy), is actually positive, albeit not significantly different from zero.  These estimates suggest 
that the pricing impact of being active in securitization is concentrated in the B-rated debt, which is the 
most commonly securitized type of loan.   18 
This 22.7 basis point spread for B-rated debt from securitization-active banks is a substantial 
magnitude; a 22.7 basis point discount on an average-sized Term Loan B facility ($400 million U.S. 
dollars) represents annual savings of close to US$ 1 Million over the life of the loan.  This estimate 
implies that the impact of the issuing bank’s identity is approximately the same as the impact of 
covenants on spreads. To the extent that the bank’s belonging to the “Securitization Active” group reflects 
the likelihood of securitization, it implies that banks are willing to discount loans substantially to be able 
to have them as collateral for CLOs. 
4.5. Comparisons of Term Loan B Facilities to Term Loan A Facilities and Revolvers 
  The results from Table 7 suggest that loans that are sold into CLOs are issued at a lower spread 
than loans that are not sold into a CLO.  In addition, the difference in spreads between loan facilities 
originated by securitization-active banks and non-securitization banks is most pronounced in facilities of 
lower credit quality, which are the loans most commonly securitized.  While we have interpreted this 
finding as a consequence of heightened demand for collateral from CLOs, an alternative explanation is 
that the results occur because of some unmeasurable bank-specific factor, such as an increase in banks’ 
risk tolerance over this period for the banks we classify as securitization-active. Such an increase in risk 
tolerance for the securitzation-active banks could lead to both an increase in securitization activity as well 
as an increase in lending to lower credit-quality borrowers, consistent with the empirical evidence 
presented thus far.  
  To distinguish between the demand for collateral and increased risk tolerance explanations for the 
lower spreads on Term Loan B facilities from securitization-active banks, we consider how other facilities 
issued by these same banks are priced.  We do so because the other facilities are not as attractive as 
collateral for CLOs as Term Loan B facilities but have similar seniority as Term Loan B facilities and 
consequently similar risk.  In particular, we estimate whether the pricing of Term Loan B facilities 
originated by securitization-active banks, especially for lower-rated loans, is different from the pricing of 
Term Loan A facilities with similar securitization-friendly attributes. To perform this test, we use a 
sample made up of both Term Loan A facilities and Term Loan B facilities, and estimate whether the   19 
relation between securitization activity, ratings, and pricing documented above for Term Loan B facilities 
also holds for Term Loan A facilities.  
In doing so, it is important to control for other differences between Term Loan A and Term Loan 
B facilities.  Both are typically senior bank debt with equal priority, but have a different payoff structure 
because Term Loan A facilities are normally amortizing and Term Loan B bullet.  Given that these loans 
have no prepayment penalties, Term Loan B facilities will always be issued at a higher spread than Term 
Loan A.  However, if the demand for collateral is largest at securitization-active banks and for B-rated 
loans, we expect the differences to be largest for these types of loans.  To evaluate this hypothesis, we 
include interaction terms into the equation that allow for separate effects based on type of loan (Term 
Loan A or Term Loan B), the securitization activity of the bank, and the rating of the borrowing firm’s 
senior debt. In addition, our estimates include the same controls as in earlier tests, as well as year and 
tranche-purpose fixed effects. 
Column (1) of Table 8 reports estimates of this equation. The effect of demand for collateral can 
be seen in the coefficient on the “Term Loan B * Securitization Active Bank * B-Rated Senior Debt”, 
which picks up the incremental effect on pricing of a loan having these attributes, which are those most 
associated with being desirable as collateral for a CLO. The results in this column indicate that 
securitization-friendly Term Loan B spreads are 32.9 basis points lower than spreads on Term Loan A 
facilities with securitization-friendly attributes. This substantial coefficient suggests that the incremental 
effect of having characteristics that make a loan particularly attractive as collateral for CLOs imply that 
these loans are sold at a substantial discount to otherwise similar loans.   
In addition to Term Loan A facilities, most loans also contain revolvers, which are lines of credit 
that can be drawn down at the borrower’s discretion. These facilities also have the same seniority as Term 
Loan B facilities but also have a shorter expected maturity.  Because the options implicit in these 
revolvers make them less attractive as collateral for CLOs, we expect to observe the spread between 
revolvers and Term Loan B’s to decline for those facilities for which the Term Loan B’s are most 
attractive as collateral for CLOs.   20 
Column (2) of Table 8 presents estimates of an equation comparing the spreads of Term Loan B’s 
and revolvers, again using interaction terms to allow for separate effects of type of loan, the rating of the 
loan and the securitization activity of the issuing bank.  The results from this equation are similar to the 
results for Term Loan A’s in the first column.  In particular, the incremental effect of having a 
securitization-active originating bank and a B rating is to lower the loan’s spread by about 20 basis points, 
and this drop is statistically significantly different from zero.  This finding is consistent with the view that 
demand for collateral for CLOs leads to a lower spread on facilities most attractive to CLO issuers. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 favor the demand for collateral explanation rather than the increased-risk 
tolerance explanation for the decline in spreads, since the latter explanation should apply equally for Term 
Loan A facilities and revolvers, while the results suggest that they are specific to Term Loan B facilities.   
4.6. Within-Loan Comparisons of Facility Spreads 
  Thus far our analysis has been conducted at the loan-facility level. In doing so, our goal was to 
measure the incremental effect that demand for collateral from CLOs has on the pricing of deals, so we 
have controlled for factors that affect spreads but are unrelated to demand for collateral.  The results 
suggest that, holding these other factors constant, the effect of characteristics associated with the 
likelihood of securitization, in particular being issued by a securitization-active bank and having a B 
rating, lowers the spread difference for a Term Loan B facility relative to an otherwise similar Term Loan 
A or revolving facility.  We interpret this finding as consistent with the demand for collateral explanation.  
However, the econometric controls we use are imperfect and it is possible that unobservable differences 
across types of loans and not demand for collateral from CLOs could explain this result. 
  Because of this issue, we use an approach introduced by Ivashina and Sun (2011) and compare 
the spreads across facilities in the same loan.  Since the facilities are from the same loan, they necessarily 
have the same risk.  Using this specification, the number of loans in the sample declines, since not all 
loans containing Term Loan B facilities also contain a Term Loan A or Revolver.  To perform this 
comparison, we estimate equations that predict the difference in spreads between Term Loan B facilities 
and either Term Loan A facilities or revolvers within the same loan as a function of factors likely to affect   21 
the demand for collateral from CLOs.
20  In doing so, we also include into the equation other factors that 
potentially affect the differences in spreads. 
  We present estimates of the within-loan spread differences in Table 9 for differences between 
Term Loan B and Term Loan A facilities, and in Table 10 for differences between Term Loan B and 
revolvers.  In each case, the coefficient on the securitization-active bank dummy variable interacted with 
the B-rated dummy variable is negative and significant (albeit at the 10% level for the revolver 
comparison in Table 10).  This finding suggests that even comparing within loans, facilities that are most 
likely to be securitized are priced at a discount relative to other facilities. It does not appear that the 
measured pricing discount of facilities likely to be securitized occurs because of unobserved 
heterogeneity; rather the evidence is consistent with the view that issuing banks price these loans more 
aggressively because they can be easily sold to CLOs. 
 
5.  Discussion and Relation to the Literature 
Perhaps the most closely related work to ours is Ivashina and Sun (2011), whose study provides 
evidence that demand for loans from institutional investors in the secondary market, measured by the time 
a loan remains in syndication, is negatively related to spreads on these loans. The authors present 
evidence that some but not all of their effect is due to demand from CLOs.
 Our analysis extends their 
work in a number of directions.  First, we focus exclusively on the role of securitization in loan pricing.  
Second, we provide direct evidence on the types of loans most associated with securitization, in 
particular, Term Loan B facilities, loans issued by banks that also issue CLOs, and loans that are made to 
B-rated borrowers.  Third, we use these characteristics as a way to identify the causal nature of the 
relation between pricing and securitization.  To the extent that Ivashina and Sun (2011)’s and our 
identification strategies are different from one another and our results are nonetheless similar, each 
                                                 
20 In the event where a bank loan includes multiple facilities of the same type, we use the facility with the lowest 
spread, so as to be conservative in our estimate of differences in spread. Of the 4,658 deals in our sample, 70 deals 
have multiple Term Loan A or Term Loan B facilities.   22 
paper’s analysis complements the other’s and strengthens the conclusion that securitization affects the 
demand for collateralizable loans, and ultimately the cost of capital in the primary market.  
In addition, this work is closely related to work on buyouts by Shivdisani and Wang (2011), who 
provide evidence suggesting that structured finance fueled the 2004-2007 LBO boom by increasing the 
availability and pricing of leverage.  Shivdasani and Wang (2011) present some evidence of a pricing 
effect in aggregate (pricing is aggregated to the quarterly level) and in a smaller loan-level sample of 
Term Loan B facilities supporting public targets of LBO transactions.  To the extent that some of the 
loans in our sample are used to finance LBOs, these findings are also consistent with those of Shivdasani 
and Wang (2011).   
However, only 12% of the facilities in our sample are used to provide financing to LBOs; the vast 
majority of them are used for general corporate purposes.  To evaluate whether our results are driven by 
the LBO loans in our sample, or whether the demand for collateral affected the cost of capital more 
generally in this period, we exclude from our sample of loans those used to finance LBOs and reestimate 
the equations reported above.
21 The results are similar to those for the full sample. Term Loan B facilities 
with securitization-friendly attributes exhibit lower spreads than Term Loan B’s without securitization-
friendly attributes, and Term Loan B’s exhibit lower spreads than Term Loan A’s and Revolvers with 
securitization-friendly attributes. Within deal results are also quantitatively similar, although differences 
between Term Loan B’s and revolvers within the same deal are not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels when LBO’s are excluded.   Overall, it appears that the pattern of securitization 
affecting the cost of debt finance affected corporate borrowing more generally than just for buyouts 
during the 2002-2007 period.  
Other related work includes Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina (2010), who test whether the CLO 
market is a lemons market by investigating whether loans originated by the bank that acts as the CLO 
underwriter underperform the rest of the CLO portfolio. Nini (2008) examines the investment behavior of 
firms more likely to benefit from securitization-driven increases in credit supply. Finally, there is a 
                                                 
21 Estimates of the main specifications from Tables 7-10 on the non-LBO subsample are reported in the Appendix.     23 
literature discussing numerous other factors outside of securitization which influence the spread charged 
to corporate borrowers in the bank loan market (See Guner (2006), Sufi (2007), and Ivashina (2009)).  
 
6. Conclusion 
  Understanding the debt buildup from 2002 through 2007 followed by the Financial Crisis of 2008 
is an important area of research for financial economists.  A key element of both the debt buildup and the 
Crisis is often thought to be the increase in securitization of loans over this period.  By packaging loans 
together in CLOs the market created a highly-rated security as a combination of low-rated (usually B-
rated) ones.  While the volumes of both loans and CLOs both increased substantially during the 
securitization-active period, the link between these phenomena is unclear.  It is possible that this high 
volume of debt issuances could reflect a high demand for capital by firms.  Alternatively, as has been 
alleged by theories of the Financial Crisis (see Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2010)), the demand from 
CLOs for securitizable loans could have led banks to lend too much.  This paper evaluates the pricing 
implications of this hypothesis, and finds support for the view that demand for securitizable loans lowers 
the cost of capital for firms. 
   Controlling for other factors, including the risk of the loan, loans that are securitized are issued at 
about a 15 basis point lower spread than an otherwise identical loan that was not securitized.  This finding 
is consistent with the notion that the demand for securitizable loans led banks wishing to securitize their 
loans to discount them to attract more borrowers.  However, there are other interpretations to this finding; 
it is possible that firms’ demand for capital is such that firms’ borrowing patterns lead loans that get 
securitized to have lower spreads. 
  As a way of evaluating explanations based on demand for capital, we consider how the relative 
spreads between loans with characteristics that are considered to be “securitization-friendly” and loans 
with characteristics considered to be “securitization-unfriendly” are different during the “Securitization 
Boom”.  In particular, we consider the payoff structure of the debt, with “Term Loan B” loans whose 
bullet payoff structures are considered more securitization-friendly than amortizing “Term Loan A” loans   24 
or revolvers, whose payoff and amount borrowed is at the discretion of the borrower.  Second, we 
consider the issuer of the loan, with banks who are top arrangers of CLOs to be more likely to securitize 
their own loans than loans from other banks.  Finally, we consider the rating of the loan, with evidence 
that loans made to B-rated borrowers  are more likely to be securitized than loans with other ratings.   
  Our findings suggest that spreads on loans with characteristics making the loan desirable to a 
CLO decline relative to other loans with less securitization-friendly characteristics during the 
Securitization Boom. The spread on Term Loan B facilities issued by securitization active banks to 
borrowers with B-rated senior debt dropped 22 basis points relative to Term Loan B facilities with less 
securitization-friendly attributes from 2002 through the fall of 2007. Consistent with the CLO demand 
hypothesis, we provide evidence that the decline in spreads is concentrated in Term Loan B facilities with 
securitization-friendly characteristics rather than Term Loan A or revolving facilities with otherwise 
similar securitization-friendly characteristics. This result suggests that the decline in spreads cannot be 
attributed to a factor associated with the particular banks originating the CLOs, such as an increase in 
their risk tolerance. This general pattern of a decline in securitization-friendly facilities relative to non-
securitization-friendly facilities over the 2002-2007 period is true even for facilities that are part of the 
same loan package, and is true for a sample excluding LBO loans. 
Taken together, we interpret the evidence as being consistent with the hypothesis that 
securitization had a causal impact on the cost of corporate capital. Were an omitted variable to be driving 
our results, it would have to be uniquely correlated with Term Loan B’s originated only by securitization 
active banks to borrowers with B-rated senior debt but uncorrelated with Term Loan A’s and revolving 
facilities with the same characteristics. Such a variable, other than securitization, is difficult to identify.   
These results raise a number of questions as well.  For example, what was the cause of increased 
demand for securitized debt? In this paper, we take increased CLO activity as given, yet we know little 
about the ultimate drivers of final demand for bonds collateralized by corporate debt. Second, does the 
securitization process, with its complicated cash flow rules and multiple market participants, lead to 
information destruction resulting in lenders not charging spreads commensurate with risks?    25 
Fundamentally, the question posed by the theoretical literature on securitization remains, namely, how 
does the restructuring of cash flows from a pool of assets into a securitization structure create real value?  
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Figure 1. Plots of Term Loan B Origination Volume.  
 
Figure 1 plots the quantity of originations of Term Loan B facilities over time. Panel A plots the three-month 
moving average of the number of Term Loan B facilities originated by securitization-active and non-securitization 
active banks, where a securitization-active bank is defined as one of the top-ten banks ranked by the number of 
securitization deals underwritten during our sample period. Panel B splits the sample into loans with B-rated senior 
debt and Ba-rated senior debt and plots the origination activity of each ratings class by securitization-active banks. 
Panel C plots differences in securitization activity by ratings class for non-securitization active banks. Section 3 of 
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Table 1. The Structure of a Typical Bank Loan.  
Kwik-Fit is a leading tyre and exhaust fitting company, operating in the UK, Netherlands, France and Germany. 
Private  equity  funds  were  both  the  buyer  and  the  seller:  PAI  bought  KwiK-Fit  from  CVC.  In  private  equity 
transactions the purchase price and level of debt are typically expressed in terms of multiples of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), as shown in the last column. In this example, the estimated 
EBITDA for 2005 of £95.9m is the reference point. Pricing of the debt is expressed relative to the London Inter-
bank  Offered  Rate  (LIBOR).  For  the  mezzanine  debt,  the  return  is  split  between  cash  interest  payments  and 
“payments in kind” (PIK).  This table is taken from Axelson et al. (2011). 
 
  Amount 
(£m) 




Enterprise Value       773.5       
         
Equity  191.0 
(25%)       
         
Debt         
  Term Loan A  140  7 year amortizing  2.25%   
  Term Loan B  135  8 year bullet  2.50%   
  Term Loan C  135  9 year bullet  3.00%   
  Total Senior Debt  410.0       
  2
nd Lien  75  9.5 year  5.00%   
  Mezzanine  97.5  10 year  4.5% + 5% PIK   
Total Debt  582.5 
(75%)       
         
Revolving credit facility  40  7 year  2.25%   
Capex facility  50  7 year  2.25%   
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Table 2. Facility Summary Statistics by Credit Rating, Facility Purpose and Facility Type. 
 
In this table we report summary statistics on the number of loan facilities and spreads by credit rating, tranche type, and facility purpose.  Our Dealscan sample 
consists of senior secured and unsecured loan facilities originated between 2002- September 2007 which have Moody’s credit ratings on the senior debt of the 
issuing firm available at the time of loan origination. We restrict our sample to include syndicated loans originated in the United States, and exclude firms with 
SIC codes between 6000 and 6500. We also identify and remove any second-lien or mezzanine loans from the sample. 
 
Panel A. 
Full Sample Securitized Sample 
Moody Sr. Debt Credit Rating Count 25th %tile Median Mean 75th %tile Count 25th %tile Median Mean 75th %tile
Ba1 642 95.0 150.0 168.6 225.0 15 150.0 175.0 180.8 225.0
Ba2 1010 125.0 200.0 209.7 250.0 37 150.0 200.0 207.4 250.0
Ba3 1676 175.0 225.0 242.2 300.0 71 200.0 225.0 226.2 250.0
B1 2135 200.0 250.0 269.5 325.0 124 200.0 250.0 247.8 287.5
B2 1591 225.0 275.0 293.8 350.0 85 225.0 250.0 262.6 275.0
B3 894 225.0 275.0 298.6 350.0 38 225.0 250.0 275.0 300.0
Panel B.
Facility Type Count 25th %tile Median Mean 75th %tile Count 25th %tile Median Mean 75th %tile
Revolver/Line >= 4310 162.5 225.0 234.4 300.0 35 200 250 237.1429 250
Term Loan A 674 200.0 250.0 249.1 300.0 29 150 200 203.0172 250
Term Loan B 2347 225.0 275.0 288.8 325.0 300 200 225 248.125 275
Panel C. 
Facility Purpose Count 25th %tile Median Mean 75th %tile Count 25th %tile Median Mean 75th %tile
Corp. purposes 2017 175.0 225.0 248.3 300.0 110 200.0 225.0 241.6 250.0
Debt Repay. 1022 175.0 227.6 238.7 300.0 35 175.0 200.0 215.7 250.0
Takeover 1096 200.0 250.0 251.4 300.0 53 200.0 225.0 242.7 275.0
Work. cap. 1120 150.0 225.0 230.1 300.0 28 175.0 225.0 225.9 275.0
LBO 906 225.0 275.0 285.3 325.0 81 225.0 250.0 263.0 300.0
Acquis. line 453 200.0 250.0 260.4 325.0 17 175.0 250.0 258.8 325.0
Other 717 202.8 250.0 272.7 314.2 40 217.2 237.5 246.5 253.1  32 
Table 3. Differences in Attributes of Non-Securitized Facilities and Securitized Facilities. 
 
In this table we report summary statistics on loan facilities identified as having been securitized and compare them against the attributes of un-securitized loans. 
The Moody’s EMS data provide a “snapshot” of the characteristics and identity of all the securities serving as collateral in any Moody’s-rated CLO as of the first 
quarter of 2009. We rely on the Moody’s EMS data services data to identify loan facilities from Dealscan that are serving as collateral in CLOs specifically. We 
outline the matching process in the text. The Dealscan sample runs from 2002- September 2007. Our Dealscan sample consists of senior secured and unsecured 
loan facilities originated between 2002- September 2007 which have Moody’s credit ratings on the senior debt of the issuing firm available at the time of loan 
origination. We restrict our sample to include syndicated loans originated in the United States, and exclude firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6500. We 







Moody's Sr. Debt Rating Non-Securitized Sample Diff. t-stat
Count  Mean Std. Dev. Count Mean Std. Dev.
Ba1 627 168.3 95.8 15 180.8 49.1 12.5 0.95
Ba2 973 209.8 110.6 37 207.4 64.8 -2.4 -0.21
Ba3 1605 242.9 96.4 71 226.2 51.2 -16.6 -2.54
B1 2011 270.8 93.8 124 247.8 63.6 -23.0 -3.78
B2 1506 295.5 121.4 85 262.6 85.2 -32.9 -3.37
B3 856 299.6 131.3 38 275.0 91.2 -24.6 -1.59
Panel B. 
Loan Attribute Non-Securitized Sample Diff. t-stat
Count  Mean Std. Dev. Count Mean Std. Dev.
Facility Amount 7833 287.2 483.7 373 525.2 725.0 238.0 6.27
Sales Size 7833 2090.6 5686.3 373 3117.5 11962.9 1026.9 1.65
Tranche Maturity* 1971 72.8 16.9 300 76.0 13.0 3.2 3.81
Syndicate Size 7811 9.0 10.1 372 7.8 8.0 -1.2 -2.78
% with Covenants 7833 63.96% - 373 66.22% -
*Term Loan B's only
Securitized
Securitized  33 
Table 4. The Creation of CLOs through Time and by Originator.  
 
This table reports the frequency and timing of CLO originations by CLO underwriter. Data is taken from Moody’s EMS database. Of the 884 reported CLOs, 
less than 1% are reported as balance sheet CLOs. The remaining are primarily “cash-flow arbitrage” CLOs. Over 80% of all deals were created between the 
2002-2007 period, with almost 50% of the deals being created in 2006 and 2007.  Over 78% of the deals were originated by the top-10 originating banks.  The 









CLO Originating Bank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
JPMorgan 0 1 0 3 2 6 6 7 7 13 26 18 5 94
Citigroup 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 17 28 24 11 85
Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. 0 0 0 4 2 3 2 3 12 13 21 17 1 78
Credit Suisse 0 0 1 2 2 2 7 10 5 12 13 14 1 69
Lehman Brothers 1 0 2 2 1 1 3 3 6 11 10 19 5 64
Deutsche Bank 0 0 1 1 0 4 3 8 5 2 16 18 5 63
Goldman Sachs & Co. 0 0 1 2 5 5 4 5 3 6 12 17 3 63
Morgan Stanley 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 7 16 18 2 63
Wachovia Securities Inc. 0 0 1 2 2 0 3 3 5 9 18 18 2 63
Merrill Lynch & Co. 1 2 4 1 3 1 2 2 4 10 7 10 3 50
Bank of America Securities LLC 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 14 7 3 37
UBS Securities LLC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 5 5 5 1 21
IXIS Securities North America Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 9 1 0 17
Barclays Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 4 4 12
CIBC World Markets Inc. 0 2 2 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Royal Bank of Scotland plc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 8
Salomon Smith Barney 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 8
BNP Paribas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 0 7
Others (28 Other Banks) 0 0 2 4 7 1 3 2 5 10 20 13 5 72
Total 3 6 16 29 31 29 43 56 64 123 220 213 51 884  34 
Table 5. Do Securitized Loans Have Lower Spreads? 
 
In this table we estimate differences in spreads between securitized and non-securitized loans in a simple regression 
framework.  We create an indicator variable for loans identified as having been securitized and estimate a regression 
of the following form:
                                                                                                  , 
where the subscript i refers to loan facility i at time t. The variables term structure, credit spread, and tranche 
maturity are discussed in the text. The covenants and pricing grid indicators take the value one for loan facilities 
with covenants and the existence of a pricing grid. The list of borrower controls includes facility-specific credit 
ratings, a dummy variable for secured loans, log facility amount, and the log of borrowers’ sales. Where appropriate, 
relevant controls include year fixed-effects, tranche purpose fixed-effects, tranche-type fixed effects, credit rating 
fixed-effects and fixed effects for the bank working as the lead arranger in organizing the syndicate of lenders. We 




Dependent Var.: All in Drawn Spread
All Loan Types, 
Ba and B-rated 
Sr. Debt
Term B Only, 
Ba and B-Rated 
Sr. Debt
Term B Only, 
Ba-Rated 
Senior Debt
Term B Only, 
B-Rated 
Senior Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Securitized Indicator -3.902 -6.864** 10.464 -15.752**
(0.74) (2.05) (1.11) (2.41)
Term Structure 6.462 3.410 -1.191 6.680
(0.79) (0.25) (0.07) (0.77)
Credit Spread 25.145*** 32.520*** 40.792*** 19.973*
(3.94) (2.81) (2.91) (1.87)
Covenants Indicator -9.338 -14.734* -24.487*** -13.204
(1.16) (1.82) (2.99) (1.51)
Pricing Grid Indicator -16.053*** -6.121 -2.462 -9.182
(2.76) (0.87) (0.34) (1.18)
Size of Syndicate -0.329*** -0.376** -0.223 -0.670***
(3.61) (2.21) (1.11) (3.92)
Tranche Maturity -0.852*** -1.085** -1.063*** -1.140*
(4.47) (2.56) (5.66) (1.86)
Log Facility Amount -17.864*** -7.248*** 0.490 -12.560***
(8.28) (3.00) (0.20) (3.70)
Log Sales Size -0.573 -2.763 -6.397*** -0.549
(0.29) (1.41) (2.84) (0.18)
Secured Indicator 11.985*** 5.168 -4.656 13.054
(3.53) (0.85) (0.50) (1.03)
Constant 616.152*** 415.755*** 343.976*** 589.509***
(14.57) (8.51) (5.81) (5.70)
Tranche Type Fixed Effects  Yes No No No
Moody Sr. Debt Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead Arranger Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.475 0.365 0.438 0.288
Observations 4449 1624 541 1083  35 
Table 6. Probit Analysis: What Type of Loans Get Securitized? 
 
The probit specification employs a sample of loan facilities originated between 2002-2009. Our sample includes 
loan facilities of three types: Revolving, Term Loan B, and Term Loan A, which serves as the omitted group in the 
estimation. The sample is also constrained to include facilities with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 
at the time of loan origination. The primary specification is as follows:                 
                                                                                                             , 
Depending on the specification, the list of borrower controls includes credit ratings, log facility amount, log of 
borrowers’ sales, and syndicate size. We include dummy variables for secured facilities and facilities with covenants 
and pricing grids. Results in the fourth column include year and tranche-purpose fixed effects. Standard errors are 











Dependent Var. = 1 if Loan is Identified 
as Having Been Securitized
Term B, Term A, 
and Revolvers
Term B, Term A, 
and Revolvers
Term B, Term A, 
and Revolvers
Term B, Term A, 
and Revolvers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Loan B 0.359*** 0.369*** 0.341*** 0.436***
(3.283) (3.396) (3.128) (3.672)
Securitization Active Arranger 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.237***
(2.689) (2.691) (2.794)
Senior Debt B-rated 0.156** 0.107
(1.987) (1.288)
Revolver -0.871*** -0.853*** -0.874*** -0.888***
(-7.301) (-7.149) (-7.327) (-6.941)
Covenants Indicator 0.065 0.055 0.069 0.311***
(0.744) (0.630) (0.796) (3.361)
Log Facility Amount 0.170*** 0.151*** 0.158*** 0.058
(4.420) (3.919) (4.096) (1.515)
Log Sales Size 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.015
(0.249) (0.0560) (0.256) (0.453)
Secured Indicator 0.539*** 0.534*** 0.522*** 0.477***
(5.341) (5.292) (5.139) (4.634)
Pricing Grid Indicator 0.083 0.077 0.076 0.074
(0.980) (0.910) (0.910) (0.849)
Syndicate Size -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.006
(-2.789) (-2.732) (-2.636) (-1.545)
Constant -5.188*** -4.883*** -5.222*** -4.653***
(-7.341) (-6.855) (-7.229) (-5.299)
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes Yes Yes
Psuedo R
2 0.197 0.200 0.201 0.268
Observations 5101 5101 5101 5021  36 
Table 7. Do “Securitization-Friendly” Term Loan B Facilities Have Lower Spreads? 
 
This table estimates the relationship between facility-level spreads and facility characteristics, specified as, 
                                                                                                    . 
The estimation sample includes only Term Loan B facilities and runs from 2002-September 2007. The sample is 
also constrained to include facilities with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 at the time of loan 
origination.   Securitization-active banks are defined as the top-10 most active CLO-underwriting banks over the 
sample period (see Table 4). B-rated senior debt is an indicator variable for facilities whose borrower has B-rated 
senior debt. The variables term structure, credit spread, and tranche maturity are discussed in the text.  The 
covenants and pricing grid indicators take the value one for loan facilities with covenants and the existence of a 
pricing grid. Other borrower controls include log facility amount, log borrower’s sales, syndicate size, and an 
indicator variable for secured loans. Relevant macroeconomic controls include year fixed-effects and tranche-
purpose fixed effects.  Results presented in Column (1) control for credit-rating fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by year and by borrower.  
 
 
Dependent Var.: All in Drawn Spread
Term Loan B 
Sample
Term Loan B 
Sample
Term Loan B 
Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Securitization Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -22.688***
(2.72)
Securitization Active Bank -11.387** -11.195* 4.255
(2.14) (1.88) (0.48)
B-rated Sr. Debt 23.317*** 40.035***
(2.58) (5.05)
Term Structure 3.861 4.284 4.298
(0.28) (0.34) (0.35)
Credit Spread 32.361*** 31.799*** 32.079***
(2.75) (2.81) (2.86)
Covenants Indicator -15.838* -20.126** -20.041**
(1.84) (2.24) (2.26)
Pricing Grid Indicator -7.161 -7.122 -7.020
(0.94) (0.82) (0.80)
Size of Syndicate -0.411** -0.474*** -0.474***
(2.33) (2.76) (2.84)
Tranche Maturity -1.124*** -1.219*** -1.203***
(2.69) (2.80) (2.77)
Log Facility Amount -8.370*** -9.408*** -9.446***
(3.47) (3.28) (3.31)
Log Sales Size -3.886* -2.736 -2.790
(1.68) (1.01) (1.04)
Secured Indicator 4.641 7.251 7.166
(0.67) (0.86) (0.85)
Constant 549.2*** 535.1*** 525.1***
(7.71) (6.21) (5.89)
Moody Sr. Debt Fixed Effects Yes No No
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Lead Arranger Fixed Effects No No No
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.352 0.322 0.324
Observations 1624 1624 1624  37 
Table 8. Is the “Securitization-Friendly” Decline in Spreads Specific to Term B’s Only? 
 
This table estimates the relationship between facility-level spreads and facility characteristics. The estimation 
sample in Column (1) includes Term Loan B and Term Loan A facilities and runs from 2002-September 2007, 
which represents a period of heightened securitization activity.  The sample is also constrained to include facilities 
with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 at the time of loan origination.  The estimation sample in 
Column (2) includes Term Loan B facilities and Revolving facilities. Securitization-active banks are defined as the 
top-10 most active CLO-underwriting banks over the sample period (see Table 4). B-rated senior debt is an indicator 
variable for facilities whose borrower has B-rated senior debt. The variables term structure, credit spread, and 
tranche maturity are discussed in the text.  The covenants and pricing grid indicators take the value one for loan 
facilities with covenants and the existence of a pricing grid. Other borrower controls include log facility amount, log 
borrower’s sales, syndicate size, and an indicator variable for secured loans.  Relevant macroeconomic controls 
include year fixed-effects and tranche-purpose fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by year and by borrower. 
 
 
Dependent Var.: All in Drawn Spread Term Loan B and 
Term Loan A Sample
Term Loan B and 
Revolver Sample
(1) (2)
Term Loan B*Sec. Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -32.886** -19.536**
(2.41) (2.07)
Term Loan B*Sec. Active Bank 21.855** -9.175
(2.04) (1.33)
Term Loan B*B-Rated Senior Debt 13.064 8.581
(0.92) (0.93)
Sec. Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt 10.149 -8.047*
(0.55) (1.81)
Term Loan B 38.229*** 54.549***
(2.93) (9.30)
Securitization Active Bank -17.416 17.218***
(1.16) (2.87)
B-rated Sr. Debt 27.036 34.064***
(1.63) (4.16)
Term Structure 2.960 7.822
(0.23) (1.12)
Credit Spread 31.899** 27.900***
(2.46) (4.43)
Covenants Indicator -19.169** -12.546
(2.16) (1.63)
Pricing Grid Indicator -8.557 -19.110***
(1.16) (2.89)




Log Facility Amount -9.020*** -20.568***
(3.34) (7.88)
Log Sales Size -3.345 0.409
(1.33) (0.20)




Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes





Observations 1915 4262  38 
Table 9. Within-Deal Differences in Loan Spreads: Term B’s vs. Term A’s. 
 
This table estimates the relationship between facility-level spreads within the same deal. For each deal in the sample 
with adequate data, we compute the within-deal difference in spreads on Term Loan B facilities compared to Term 
Loan A facilities. The estimation sample runs from 2002-September 2007, which represents a period of heightened 
securitization activity.  The sample is also constrained to include facilities with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, 
B2, and B3 at the time of loan origination.  Securitization-active banks are defined as the top-10 most active CLO-
underwriting banks over the sample period (see Table 4). B-rated senior debt is an indicator variable for facilities 
whose borrower has B-rated senior debt.  The variables term structure, credit spread, and tranche maturity are 
discussed in the text.  The covenants and pricing grid indicators take the value one for loan facilities with covenants 
and the existence of a pricing grid. Other borrower controls include senior-debt credit ratings, log facility amount, 
log borrower’s sales, and an indicator variable for secured loans.  Relevant macroeconomic controls include year 
fixed-effects and tranche-purpose fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by year and by borrower. 
 
 
Dependent Var.: Within Deal Spread
Term Loan B 
Spread vs. Term 
Loan A Spread in 
the Same Deal
Term Loan B 
Spread vs. Term 
Loan A Spread in 
the Same Deal
Term Loan B 
Spread vs. Term 
Loan A Spread in 
the Same Deal
(1) (2) (3)
Securitization Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -44.804***
(3.73)
Securitization Active Bank -22.651 -16.832 10.188
(1.58) (0.94) (0.42)
B-rated Sr. Debt 5.004 41.883
(0.25) (1.40)
Term Structure 9.259 12.254 11.495
(1.50) (1.48) (1.17)
Credit Spread 8.532 6.319 2.855
(0.98) (0.44) (0.18)
Covenants Indicator 25.356 23.231 20.236
(1.27) (1.04) (0.95)
Pricing Grid Indicator -4.666 -3.564 -3.636
(0.52) (0.48) (0.47)
Term A Pricing Grid Indicator -29.657** -31.442*** -29.441**
(2.30) (2.79) (2.56)
Size of Syndicate 0.052 -0.021 -0.021
(0.34) (0.16) (0.12)
Tranche Maturity -0.816* -1.187*** -1.098***
(1.77) (2.97) (2.71)
Term A Maturity 0.877* 0.996** 0.914**
(1.79) (2.53) (2.45)
Log Facility Amount 0.562 -5.717 -4.527
(0.09) (0.94) (0.71)
Term A Facility Amount -9.556 -8.444* -8.799*
(1.62) (1.90) (1.89)
Log Sales Size 4.975 8.189* 7.645*
(1.05) (1.76) (1.82)
Secured Indicator 13.888 10.949 15.018
(0.85) (0.62) (0.82)
Constant 54.339 223.597* 189.847
(0.49) (1.83) (1.55)
Moody Sr. Debt Fixed Effects Yes No No
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.296 0.220 0.232
Observations 186 186 186  39 
Table 10. Within-Deal Differences in Loan Spreads: Term B’s vs. Revolver’s. 
 
This table estimates the relationship between facility-level spreads within the same deal. For each deal in the sample, 
we compute the within-deal difference in spreads on Term Loan B facilities compared to Revolving facilities. The 
estimation sample runs from 2002-September 2007, which represents a period of heightened securitization activity. 
The sample is also constrained to include facilities with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 at the time 
of loan origination.  Securitization-active banks are defined as the top-10 most active CLO-underwriting banks over 
the sample period (see Table 4). B-rated senior debt is an indicator variable for facilities whose borrower has B-rated 
senior debt. 
 
The variables term structure, credit spread, and tranche maturity are discussed in the text.  The 
covenants and pricing grid indicators take the value one for loan facilities with covenants and the existence of a 
pricing grid. Other borrower controls include senior-debt credit ratings, log facility amount, log borrower’s sales, 
and an indicator variable for secured loans.  Relevant macroeconomic controls include year fixed-effects and 
tranche-purpose fixed-effects.  Standard errors are clustered by year and by borrower. 
 
 
Dependent Var.: Within Deal Spread
Term Loan B 
Spread vs. 
Revolver Spread in 
the Same Deal
Term Loan B 
Spread vs. 
Revolver Spread in 
the Same Deal
Term Loan B 
Spread vs. 
Revolver Spread in 
the Same Deal
(1) (2) (3)
Securitization Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -12.357*
(1.63)
Securitization Active Bank -9.017** -8.979** -0.435
(2.47) (2.47) (0.07)
B-rated Sr. Debt -4.455 4.558
(0.60) (0.59)
Term Structure -0.437 0.721 0.744
(0.07) (0.13) (0.14)
Credit Spread 3.572 7.134 7.157
(0.71) (0.92) (0.91)
Covenants Indicator 1.082 1.156 0.719
(0.17) (0.18) (0.12)
Pricing Grid Indicator -4.393** -4.214** -4.144**
(2.33) (2.08) (2.03)
Revolver Pricing Grid Indicator -2.481 -2.628 -2.102
(0.42) (0.46) (0.38)
Size of Syndicate -0.041 -0.048 -0.053
(0.17) (0.20) (0.21)
Tranche Maturity -0.094 -0.091 -0.075
(0.86) (0.83) (0.74)
Revolver Maturity 0.157 0.159 0.152
(1.06) (1.09) (1.06)
Log Facility Amount -11.361** -11.427** -11.435**
(2.42) (2.39) (2.42)
Revolver Facility Amount 7.689** 7.608** 7.570**
(2.31) (2.36) (2.35)
Log Sales Size 0.339 0.319 0.290
(0.26) (0.24) (0.22)
Secured Indicator 1.774 1.744 1.936
(0.23) (0.23) (0.25)
Constant 110.503** 80.339* 93.098**
(2.33) (1.72) (1.99)
Moody Sr. Debt Fixed Effects Yes No No
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.072 0.073
Observations 1160 1160 1160  40 
Appendix Table 1: Differences in Securitization-Friendly Spreads: Excluding LBO Loans. 
 
This table estimates the relationship between facility-level spreads and facility characteristics. Each estimation 
sample in this table excludes any bank loan affiliated with LBO transactions.  The estimation sample runs from 
2002-September 2007, which represents a period of heightened securitization activity.  The sample is also 
constrained to include facilities with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 at the time of loan origination. 
Column (1) includes Term Loan B facilities only. Column (2) includes Term Loan B and Term Loan A facilities and 
Column (3) includes Term Loan B facilities and Revolving facilities. Securitization-active banks are defined as the 
top-10 most active CLO-underwriting banks over the sample period (see Table 4). B-rated senior debt is an indicator 
variable for facilities whose borrower has B-rated senior debt. The variables term structure, credit spread, and 
tranche maturity are discussed in the text.  The covenants and pricing grid indicators take the value one for loan 
facilities with covenants and the existence of a pricing grid. Other borrower controls include senior-debt credit 
ratings, log facility amount, log borrower’s sales, and an indicator variable for secured loans.  Relevant 
macroeconomic controls include year fixed-effects and tranche-purpose fixed-effects.  Standard errors are clustered 
by year and by borrower. 
 
Dependent Var.: All in Drawn Spread
Term Loan B 
Sample, 
Excluding LBO's
Term Loan B and 
Term Loan A Sample, 
Excluding LBO's




Term Loan B*Sec. Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -40.025*** -19.769**
(2.84) (2.01)
Term Loan B*Sec. Active Bank 22.430** -9.613
(2.15) (1.46)
Term Loan B*B-Rated Senior Debt 24.371* 12.611
(1.77) (1.21)
Sec. Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -21.780** 18.345 -6.208
(2.48) (0.96) (1.30)
Term Loan B 33.805*** 51.477***
(2.63) (8.89)
Securitization Active Bank 3.224 -18.970 17.603***
(0.34) (1.35) (2.87)
B-rated Sr. Debt 45.922*** 21.789 36.451***
(6.17) (1.33) (4.12)
Term Structure -0.453 -1.265 5.575
(0.04) (0.10) (0.83)
Credit Spread 30.044** 29.893** 25.699***
(2.56) (2.16) (3.83)
Covenants Indicator -23.478** -21.991** -12.081
(2.24) (2.19) (1.28)
Pricing Grid Indicator -8.457 -10.480 -21.389***
(0.94) (1.37) (3.09)
Size of Syndicate -0.498*** -0.509*** -0.588***
(2.80) (2.92) (4.65)
Tranche Maturity -1.138*** -1.182***
(2.66) (2.92)
Log Facility Amount -10.399*** -10.019*** -21.288***
(3.21) (3.61) (7.22)
Log Sales Size -3.571 -4.125 0.065
(1.12) (1.42) (0.03)
Secured Indicator 11.218 10.829 18.887***
(1.21) (1.47) (3.98)
Constant 439.602*** 410.796*** 599.422***
(6.39) (4.41) (13.09)
Moody Sr. Debt Fixed Effects No No No
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Lead Arranger Fixed Effects No No No
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.334 0.399 0.422
Observations 1353 1626 3699  41 
Appendix Table 2: Within-Deal Differences in Loan Spreads: Excluding LBO Loans. 
This table estimates the relationship between facility-level spreads within the same deal. Each estimation sample in 
this table excludes any bank loan affiliated with LBO transactions.  For each deal in the sample, we compute the 
within-deal difference in spreads on Term Loan B facilities compared to Term Loan A or Revolving facilities. 
Column (1) estimates differences in within deal spreads between Term Loan B facilities and Term Loan A facilities. 
Column (2) compares Term Loan B’s against Revolvers. The estimation sample runs from 2002-September 2007, 
which represents a period of heightened securitization activity. The sample is also constrained to include facilities 
with senior debt rated Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 at the time of loan origination.    Securitization-active banks 
are defined as the top-10 most active CLO-underwriting banks over the sample period (see Table 4). B-rated senior 
debt is an indicator variable for facilities whose borrower has B-rated senior debt.  The variables term structure, 
credit spread, and tranche maturity are discussed in the text.  The covenants and pricing grid indicators take the 
value one for loan facilities with covenants and the existence of a pricing grid. Other borrower controls include 
senior-debt credit ratings, log facility amount, log borrower’s sales, and an indicator variable for secured loans.  
Relevant macroeconomic controls include year fixed-effects and tranche-purpose fixed-effects.  Standard errors are 
clustered by year and by borrower. 
 
 
Dependent Var.: Within Deal Spread
Term Loan B Spread vs. 
Term Loan A Spread in the 
Same Deal, Excluding LBO's
Term Loan B Spread vs. 
Revolving Spread in the 
Same Deal, Excluding LBO's
(1) (2)
Securitization Active Bank*B-Rated Senior Debt -38.616*** -13.028
(3.31) (1.35)
Securitization Active Bank 9.532 0.828
(0.44) (0.11)
B-rated Sr. Debt 26.543 1.494
(1.53) (0.24)
Term Structure 21.297*** 2.990
(2.82) (0.53)
Credit Spread 13.068 11.027*
(1.61) (1.68)
Covenants Indicator 19.705 3.117
(1.03) (0.40)
Pricing Grid Indicator -6.706 -7.308***
(0.93) (4.17)
Term A Pricing Grid Indicator (Revolver in Column 3) -31.070** -1.408
(2.13) (0.22)
Size of Syndicate 0.022 -0.140
(0.13) (0.42)
Tranche Maturity -1.157*** -0.109
(2.64) (1.14)
Term A Maturity (Revolver in Column 3) 1.032** 0.181
(2.19) (1.32)
Log Facility Amount -0.867 -13.266**
(0.25) (2.53)
Term A Facility Amount (Revolver in Column 3) -13.076*** 8.943***
(2.62) (2.67)
Log Sales Size 7.910** -0.759
(2.02) (0.49)




Moody Sr. Debt Fixed Effects No No
Tranche Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by:
Borrower Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.083
Observations 171 939